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Abstract—We study how to secure distributed filters for linear
time-invariant systems with bounded noise under sensor attacks.
A malicious attacker is able to manipulate the observations
arbitrarily for a time-varying and unknown subset of the sensors.
We first propose a recursive distributed filter consisting of
two steps at each update. The first step employs a saturation-
like scheme, which gives a small gain if the innovation is
large corresponding to a potential attack. The second step is
a consensus operation of state estimates among neighboring
sensors. We prove the estimation error is upper bounded if the
filter parameters satisfy a condition, whose feasibility for unstable
systems is studied by providing an easy-to-check sufficient and
necessary condition. We further connect this condition to 2s-
sparse observability in the centralized case. When the attacked
sensor set is time-invariant, the secured filter is modified by
adding an online local attack detector. The detector is able to find
out the attacked sensors whose observation innovations are larger
than the detection threshold. Also, with more attacked sensors
being detected, the threshold will adaptively adjust to reduce
the space of the stealthy attack signals. The resilience of the
secured filter with detection is verified by an explicit relationship
between the upper bound of the estimation error and the number
of detected attacked sensors. Moreover, for the noise-free case,
we prove that the state estimate of each sensor asymptotically
converges to the system state. Numerical simulations are provided
to illustrate the developed results.
1. INTRODUCTION
A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a physical system con-
trolled and monitored by computer-based algorithms. During
recent years, numerous applications in sensor network, ve-
hicle networks, process control, smart grid, etc, have been
investigated. With higher integration of large-scale computer
networks and complex physical processes, these systems are
confronting more security issues both in the cyber and physical
layers. Thus, the research on CPS security is attracting more
and more attention.
Sensors and sensor networks are utilized to collect environ-
mental data in a CPS. The quality of these sensors are essential
for decision making. However, with the increasing number
of complex tasks and cheap and low-quality sensors, the
vulnerability of the system operation is inevitably increased.
In this paper, we consider the scenario illustrated in Fig. 1,
where a distributed sensor network with 30 sensors is equipped
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Fig. 1. A distributed sensor network with attacked sensor observations.
to collaboratively observe the state of a CPS. In this case,
6 sensors in red are under attack in the sense that their
observations can be arbitrarily manipulated. We are interested
to find a distributed filter to estimate the system state by
employing the information provided by the sensor network
in Fig. 1.
A large number of distributed filters for sensor networks
have been proposed in the literature, e.g., [1–3]. These filters,
however, would not work well in attack scenarios like Fig. 1
for two reasons: One is that the attacker would destroy the
probability distribution of the observations by injecting attack
signals with any distribution. Then the filtering gain prior-
designed based on the error distribution is no longer suitable in
the observation update. The other reason is that once a sensor
is under attack, based on the eavesdropping knowledge on the
systems and the algorithms, the attacker can strategically inject
faulty observations to degrade the estimation performance.
Thus for the scenario in Fig. 1, the following questions are
worthy investigating
1) How to modify a distributed filter such that it is resilient
when some sensors are under attack?
2) What is the maximal number of attacked sensors, under
which filter stability is guaranteed?
3) How to detect which sensors are attacked and how to
remove their influence on the filter performance?
Related work
The security problems of CPSs have been extensively
studied in the literature, involving controller design [4, 5],
online optimization [6, 7], machine learning [8], multi-agent
consensus [9], function calculation [10], etc. Quite a few
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2results related to sensor attacks and attack detections were
given based on the centralized framework, where a data
center exists. The center can process all the compromised
observations received from the attacked sensors to estimate the
system state. Thus, some centralized optimization and design
methods were utilized to achieve resilient state estimation
and effective attack detection [11–19]. To find out whether
sensors are under attack and to identify the attack signals
inserted to the systems, a study on attack detection and
identification for CPSs was given in [11], where the design
methods and analysis techniques for centralized monitors were
discussed as well. To obtain attack-resilient state estimates,
some centralized state estimators or observers were proposed
based on optimization techniques [12–16, 19], which usually
face heavy computational complexity in the brute force search.
In [12], for CPSs suffering sensor attacks, the authors studied
the maximum number of attacks that can be detected and
corrected and showed that if more than half sensors were
attacked, it is impossible to accurately recover the system
state. In [13, 14], the attack-resilient state estimation problems
were investigated for noisy systems under sensor attacks. The
authors analyzed upper bounds of the estimation errors for the
estimators based on l0 and l1-norm optimizations. In [15, 16],
the authors considered the secure state estimation problem
for sensor attacks by employing satisfiability modulo theory,
which in certain cases can harness the complexity in solving
the combination optimization with respect to the attacked
sensor set. In [17], the authors proposed a sparse detectability,
under which the performance of a Luenberger estimator was
analyzed. A convex optimization based general state estimator
was studied in [19] for sparse sensor attacks, where the
authors analyzed the sufficient and necessary condition for the
estimation resilience. A probabilistic approach was given in
[18] to estimate a static parameter in a fusion center under the
sparse injecting attacks on sensor observations.
For the problems of distributed estimation under sensor
attacks, since each sensor can only obtain limited information
from local observations and neighboring communications, cen-
tralized methods could not be easily extended to the distributed
scenarios. Moreover, the communication topology of a sensor
network plays an important role in the design and analysis of
distributed estimators [20–22]. In the following, we introduce
and compare some related literature on distributed estimation
under sensor attacks.
The Byzantine general problem is a term from the computer
system to describe the situation where system actors must
achieve agreement/consensus on a certain strategy in order
to avoid complete failure [23]. But there are some unreli-
able or failed actors in the system and a normal actor has
no information on whether another actor is failed or not.
The unreliable system actors, also called Byzantine agents,
can disseminate faulty information to other normal actors
(agents) for the system degradation. In the past three decades,
Byzantine faulty problems have been extensively studied in
distributed computing for the solution consensus of normal
agents against an unknown group of Byzantine agents (see
[24–26] and the reference therein). It is well known that in
complete graphs, there are no consensus algorithms which
can tolerate more than 1/3 Byzantine agents [23]. In recent
years, some investigations in the study of sensor networks have
been made for the distributed state estimation of dynamical
systems [20, 21], the distributed identification of a static vector
parameter [7], and distributed stochastic gradient decent [27]
under Byzantine sensor attacks/failures. In [20], the authors
designed a Byzantine-resilient distributed observer for linear
time-invariant (LTI) systems by analyzing robustness of com-
munication graph and eigenvalues of system transition matrix.
The methods and analysis were extended by [21] to the system
suffering communication losses and intermittent observations.
In [7], a Byzantine-robust distributed algorithm was given
by employing local noisy observations, and the asymptotic
convergence and finite-time convergence rate were analyzed,
respectively. Although these papers studied the worst sensor
attacks (i.e., the Byzantine attacks), they all require complete
connectivity or strong robustness of graphs, which would be
quite restrictive for the systems suffering milder attacks such
as the attacks occurring in sensor observations [22, 28].
In distributed sensor networks, other kinds of attacks milder
than the Byzantine-type attack have also been studied in the
literature. In [29], a distributed observer with attack detection
was proposed to deal with a class of biasing attacks in
the observer update or sensor communication. Distributed
estimation for a static parameter under sensor observation
attack was studied in [28, 30], where consistency of the
estimators was studied under a collective observability. In [22],
for the attack in sensor observations, a distributed optimization
based method was utilized to achieve convergence of the
observer under 2s-sparse observability for LTI systems [31].
Nevertheless, the results rely on the redesign of topology
graph and infinite sensor communications between two ob-
servation updates. The authors in [32] studied the distributed
dimensionality reduction fusion estimation for CPSs under
the denial-of-service attack, which can congest the commu-
nication channel. In [33], for the faulty data injection attack
in communication networks, a distributed detection problem
was studied for a group of interconnected subsystems, and
an extended application to DC microgrids was given in [34].
In [35], a Bayesian framework based joint distributed attack
detection and state estimation were investigated in a cluster-
based sensor network by considering the faulty data injection
in the communications between remote sensors and fusion
nodes. However, the accurate probability distribution of attacks
was required. To the knowledge of the authors, there were
few results considering how to achieve the co-design of the
distributed estimator and detector by dynamically adjusting the
related parameters in the estimator and detector.
Contributions and Organization of the Paper
In this paper, we study how to secure distributed filters
for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noises over
a smart-sensor1 network, where the observations of a time-
varying and unknown subset of sensors are compromised.
1A smart sensor is a device which has some capability in storage, calcula-
tion and communication besides the primary role of sensing.
3The main contributions of this paper are summarized in the
following.
1) We propose a secured distributed filter consisting of two
steps (Algorithm 1). The first step employs a saturation-
like scheme, which gives a small gain if the innovation
is large corresponding to a potential attack. The second
step is a consensus operation of state estimates among
neighboring sensors.
2) We investigate some properties of the secured filter.
First, we prove the estimation error is upper bounded if
the filter parameters satisfy a condition, whose feasibility
for unstable systems is studied by providing an easy-
to-check sufficient and necessary condition (Theorems
1 and 2). We further connect this condition to 2s-
sparse observability in the centralized case (Proposition
3). Furthermore, we provide a condition under which
the observations of the attack-free sensors will not be
saturated after a finite time and a tighter error bound is
obtained (Theorem 3).
3) When the attacked sensor set is time-invariant, we
modify the secured distributed filter by adding an attack
detector (Algorithm 2). The detector is able to find
out the attacked sensors whose observation innovations
are larger than the detection threshold (Proposition 4).
Furthermore, with more attacked sensors being detected,
the threshold will adaptively adjust to reduce the space
of the stealthy attack signals.
4) We study some properties of the secured filter with
attack detection. First, the resilience of the filter is
verified by an explicit relationship between the upper
bound of the estimation error and the number of detected
attacked sensors (Theorem 4). Moreover, for the noise-
free case, we prove that the state estimate of each
sensor asymptotically converges to the system state
under certain conditions (Theorem 5).
Different from conventional filters with statistics-based
gains (e.g., Kalman filter), we provide an innovation-
dependent filtering gain, which confines the influence of attack
signals to the estimation error but brings technical difficulties
in performance analysis. Inspired by bounded-input bounded-
output (BIBO) stability, a new tool is provided to analyze
the boundedness of the estimation error. The distribution
assumption on attack signal ( [29]) is removed in this work by
allowing that the attacker can manipulate the observations of
an attacked sensor arbitrarily. Moreover, the assumption that
the attacked sensor set is fixed over time in both centralized
frameworks [12, 13, 15–19] and distributed frameworks [20–
22] is extended to the case that the attacked sensor set could be
time-varying. The robustness requirement of communication
graphs in [20, 21] and the requirement of infinite communi-
cation times between two updates in [22] are both removed in
this paper.
This paper builds on the preliminary work presented in [36]
and [37]. The main difference is four-fold. First, the set of the
attacked sensors is extended from the time-invariant case to the
time-varying case. Second, a new section dealing with attack
detection and sensor isolation is added in this work. Third,
the results in [36] and [37] are generalized in this paper and
new theoretical results with proofs are added. Fourth, more
literature comparisons and simulation results are provided.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
2 is on the problem formulation. Section 3 provides the secured
distributed filter and its performance analysis. The secured
distributed filter with an online attack detector is studied in
Section 4. After numerical simulations in Section 5, the paper
is concluded in Section 6. The main proofs are given in
Appendix.
Notations. The superscript “T” represents the transpose.
Rn×m is the set of real matrices with n rows and m columns.
Rn is the set of n-dimensional real vectors. R+ and Z+ are
the sets of positive real scalars and integers, respectively. In
stands for the n-dimensional square identity matrix. 1N stands
for the N -dimensional vector with all elements being one.
diag{·} represents the diagonalization operator. A⊗B is the
Kronecker product of A and B. ‖x‖ is the 2-norm of a vector
x. ‖A‖ is the induced 2-norm, i.e., ‖A‖ = sup
x 6=0
‖Ax‖
‖x‖ . λmin(A),
λ2(A) and λmax(A) are the minimal, second minimal and
maximal eigenvalues of a real-valued symmetric matrix A,
respectively. |Γ| is the cardinality of the set Γ. min{a, b}
means the minimum between the real-valued scalars a and
b. For a set A, the indicator function Ia∈A = 1, if a ∈ A;
Ia∈A = 0, otherwise. d·e is the ceiling function.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first provide some graph preliminaries
and then setup the problem of this paper.
A. Graph Preliminaries
In this paper, we model the communication topology of N
sensors by an undirected graph G = (V, E) without self loops,
where V = {1, 2, . . . , N} stands for the set of nodes, and
E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges. If there is an edge (j, i) ∈ E ,
node i can exchange information with node j, and node j is
called a neighbor of node i. Let the neighbor set of sensor i
be Ni := {j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E}. The degree matrix of G is DG =
diag{|N1|, . . . , |NN |}. The adjacency matrix is AG = [ai,j ],
where ai,j = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and ai,j = 0 otherwise. L = DG−
AG is the Laplacian matrix. The graph G is connected if for
any pair of two different nodes i1, il, there exists a path from
i1 to il consisting of edges (i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (il−1, il). On
the connectivity of a graph, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. [38] The undirected graph G is connected if
and only if λ2(L) > 0.
B. System model
For a sensor network G under sensor attacks, we illustrate
the scenario in Fig. 1, in which each senor is equipped with a
filter to estimate the system state (see Fig. 2 for a diagram).
The state-space system model is given as follows
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + w(t)
yi(t) = Cix(t) + vi(t) + ai(t), i = 1, . . . , N,
(1)
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Fig. 2. Each sensor is equipped with a filter providing an estimate xˆi of
the plant x. The sensor observation yi is potentially compromised through an
attack signal ai.
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the unknown system state, w(t) ∈ Rn the
process noise, vi(t) ∈ R the observation noise, ai(t) ∈ R the
attack signal inserted by some malicious attacker, and yi(t) ∈
R the observation of sensor i, all at time t. Moreover, A ∈
Rn×n is the system state transition matrix, and Ci ∈ R1×n is
the observation vector of sensor i. Without losing generality,
we assume that the observation vectors are normalized, i.e.,
‖Ci‖ = 1, i ∈ V = {1, . . . , N}. Otherwise, we can reconstruct
the observation equation of system (1).
In this paper, we consider the observation equation in (1)
with scalar outputs for each sensor. This conforms with the
centralized framework, where each row vector of the central-
ized observation matrix stands for the observation vector of
one sensor [12]. For the case that outputs of some sensors
are not scalar, we can replace each of these sensors by a set
of virtual sensors with scalar ouputs, which are completely
connected and connected to the neighbors of the original
sensor. Then, the problem will reduce to the one studied in
this paper.
The following assumptions are in need.
Assumption 1. The following conditions hold
sup
t
‖w(t)‖ ≤ bw
max
i∈V
sup
t
‖vi(t)‖ ≤ bv
‖xˆ(0)− x(0)‖ ≤ η0,
where xˆ(0) is the initial estimate of x(0) shared by all sensors.
The bounds in Assumption 1 are not necessarily known
to sensors. They are utilized in the subsequent performance
analysis and offline parameter design.
Assumption 2. The communication graph G is undirected and
connected.
Different from [20, 21, 39] requiring some robustness of
communication graphs, the connectivity of Assumption 2 is a
standard condition for distributed estimation. If the graph is
not connected, the problem can be studied for the connected
subgraphs separately.
A typical distributed filtering problem is to design an online
filter or state estimator for each sensor i to estimate the system
state x(t) by employing local noisy observations {yi(l)}tl=1
and messages received from neighboring sensors. However, if
a subset of sensors are compromised by a malicious attacker
through strategically injecting the attack signals into the ob-
servations of these sensors, the estimation performance of the
conventional filters (e.g., Kalman filter) would be seriously
degraded. In the following, we introduce the attack model.
C. Attack model
To deteriorate estimation performance of filtering algo-
rithms, a malicious attacker aims to compromise the observa-
tion data of some targeted sensors. However, due to resource
limitation, the attacker can only attack a subset of all sensors
at each time. Let A(t) and Ac(t) be the set of attacked sensors
and the set of attack-free sensors at time t, respectively. Thus,
|A(t)| + |Ac(t)| = N. We require the following assumption
on the attack model.
Assumption 3. The attacker can implement the following
attacks to system (1): for t = 1, 2, . . . ,
ai(t) ∈ R, i ∈ A(t), |A(t)| ≤ s
ai(t) = 0, i ∈ Ac(t),
(2)
where the sets A(t) and Ac(t) are unknown to each sensor,
but s is known to the filter designer.
In Assumption 3, we consider the worst scenario on compro-
mised observations that the attacker can inject attack signals
with any distribution, which is more general than results
in the literature [29]. Moreover, Assumption 3 removes the
requirement in [12, 13, 15–19, 39, 40] that the attacked sensor
set is fixed over time.
D. Problem of interest
We aim to answer the following questions in the sequel,
corresponding to the questions 1)–3) in the introduction.
Q1) To cooperatively estimate x(t) by a sensor network,
how to secure a distributed filter such that it is resilient for
the case that some sensors are under attack?
Q2) What is the maximal number of the attacked sensors
(i.e., s), beyond which the estimation error is no longer
bounded?
Q3) If the attacked sensor set is fixed, i.e., A(t) = A, how
to detect the attacked sensors in A and remove their influence
to the filtering performance?
The above questions are interesting because of the aspects
as follows: 1) The dynamics of the system (1) are potentially
unstable. This increases the difficulty in designing a distributed
filter with the bounded estimation error. 2) The system is
collective observable. Even if it is local observable for every
sensor, the problem is still of interest, since the sensor has
no knowledge of whether its observations have been compro-
mised or not. 3) The attacked set of sensors is unknown and
time-varying. Then, the optimization-based attack detection
methods ([12–16, 19]) could not be utilized. 4) There is a
tradeoff on the usage of the sensor observations. On one hand,
if some sensors under attack are fully trusted, the attacker
have much space to deteriorate the estimation performance by
strategically injecting attack signals into the observations of
these sensors. On the other hand, if little confidence is given
to the observations, although the most possible attack signals
may be filtered, observations of the attack-free sensors will
contribute little to the estimation performance. Then, the state
estimation error could be very large.
53. SECURED DISTRIBUTED FILTER
In this section, we will design a secured distributed filter
for each sensor, and analyze some properties of the filter.
A. Filter design
We consider the filter with two steps, namely, observation
update and estimate consensus. In the step of observation
update, by choosing β > 0, we design a saturation-like scheme
to utilize the observation yi(t) as follows
x˜i(t) =Axˆi(t− 1) + ki(t)CTi (yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)), (3)
where
ki(t) =
{
1, if |yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)| ≤ β,
β
|yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t−1)| , otherwise.
(4)
Different from the gain designs of conventional filters or
state observers, the gain ki(t) is related to the estimation
innovation (i.e., yi(t) − CiAxˆi(t − 1)). The design of ki(t)
in (4) makes sense, since if the innovation is large, the
observation yi(t) is more likely to be compromised. By the
designed gain ki(t), we have |ki(t)(yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t−1))| ≤ β,
which ensures that the attacker has limited influence to the
local update. β is the observation confidence parameter which
reflects the usage tradeoff between attack-free observations
and attacked observations. If β is very large, then almost all
attack-free observations will be utilized without saturation.
But, it will give much space that the attacker can use to
deteriorate the estimation performance. If β is very small,
although most attack signals {ai(t)} may be filtered by
the designed gain ki(t), many attack-free observations will
contribute little to the estimation performance. As a result, the
filtering error of each sensor would probably diverge if the
system is unstable. The design of β will be discussed in next
subsection.
In the step of estimate consensus, a two-time scale is
considered. We suppose that each sensor can communicate
with its neighbors for L ≥ 1 times between two time steps.
For l = 1, 2, . . . , L, and α > 0,
xˆi,l(t) = xˆi,l−1(t)− α
∑
j∈Ni
(xˆi,l−1(t)− xˆj,l−1(t)), (5)
with xˆi,0(t) = x˜i(t), and xˆi(t) = xˆi,L(t). For each com-
munication, sensor j transmits its estimate xˆj,l−1(t) to its
neighbors, l = 1, . . . , L.
The term α
∑
j∈Ni(xˆi,l−1(t)− xˆj,l−1(t)) is to make sensor
estimates tend to consensus. The consensus step is vital to
guarantee the bounded estimation error of distributed filters
especially for the case that each subsystem is not observable
(i.e., (A,Ci) is not observable). It can be proven that if the
consensus step L goes to infinity and the parameter α is
properly designed, then the estimates {xˆi(t)}Ni=1 will converge
to the same vector. However, the requirement for infinite
communication times between two updates in [30, 41], is
removed in this work. The design of L and α will be studied in
next subsection. By (3)–(5), we provide the secured distributed
filter in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secured Distributed Filter:
1: Initial setting: (xˆi(0), β, L, α)
2: Update: For each sensor i
ki(t) = min{1, β|yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t−1)|}
x˜i(t) = Axˆi(t− 1) + ki(t)CTi (yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1))
3: Estimate consensus: For each sensor i, xˆi,0(t) = x˜i(t)
For lth consensus, l = 1, . . . , L:
For sensor i, i = 1, . . . , N :
Sensor i receives xˆj,l−1(t) from neighbor sensor j,
xˆi,l(t) = xˆi,l−1(t)− α
∑
j∈Ni(xˆi,l−1(t)− xˆj,l−1(t))
end
end
4: Output step: xˆi(t) = xˆi,L(t).
B. Performance analysis
Since the filtering gains {ki(t)}Ni=1 are related to the state
estimates and potential compromised observations, the com-
mon stability analysis approaches, such as Lyapunov methods,
may not be directly utilized. This is the main technique chal-
lenge of this paper. Inspired by BIBO stability, we provide the
following lemma to analyze the boundedness of the estimation
error.
Lemma 1. Consider the equation xt+1 = F (xt)xt+q0, where
x0 ≥ 0 and F (·) ∈ [0, 1] is a monotonically non-decreasing
function and q0 ≥ 0. If the set Γ = {t ≥ 1|xt ≤ xt−1} is
non-empty, the following conclusions hold:
1) If q0 6= 0, then for ∀t0 ∈ Γ,
xt ≤ F t−t0(xt0)xt0 + q0
1− F t−t0(xt0)
1− F (xt0)
, t ≥ t0,
2) sup
t≥t0
xt ≤ xt0 , ∀t0 ∈ Γ,
3) lim sup
t→∞
xt ≤ inf
t0∈Γ
xt0 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
If we treat xt as an upper bound of the norm of the
estimation error, based on the knowledge of xt0 , we are able
to use 1) to obtain the real-time upper bound of xt, and
apply 2) and 3) to obtain the uniform upper bound of xt,
respectively. Therefore, Lemma 1 can be a tool in analyzing
the boundedness of the estimation error for the class of
dynamics in Lemma 1.
Denote
λ0 := minJ⊂{1,2,...,N}:|J |=N−s
λmin
(∑
i∈J
CTi Ci
)
. (6)
where s is the upper bound of the attacked sensor number,
given in (2). Due to ‖Ci‖ = 1, we have λ0 ∈ [0, N − s]. To
apply Lemma 1, we construct the sequence {ρt ∈ R|ρt} in
the following
ρt+1 = F (ρt)ρt + q0, ρ0 = η0 (7)
6where η0 is given in Assumption 1 and
F (ρt) = ‖A‖
(
1− k
∗(ρt)
N
λ0
)
,
k∗(ρt) = min
{
1,
β
‖A‖ (p0 + ρt) + bw + bv
}
,
q0 =
N − s
N
(bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0) + bw + sβ
N
,
p0 =
√
NβγL
1− ‖A‖ γL ,
γ =
λmax(L)− λ2(L)
λmax(L) + λ2(L) .
(8)
The following result shows the estimation error of Algorithm
1 is bounded.
Theorem 1. (Bounds) Let Assumptions 1–3 hold and α =
2
λ2(L)+λmax(L) . If there exist L >
ln‖A‖
ln γ−1 , β ∈ R+, η0 ∈ R+,
such that
η0(1− F (η0)) ≥ q0, (9)
then based on the sequence {ρt} in (7), the set Γ = {t ≥
1|ρt ≤ ρt−1} is non-empty with t = 1 ∈ Γ. Furthermore,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the estimation error ei(t) = xˆi(t)− x(t)
satisfies the following properties:
1) The estimation error is bounded at each time, i.e., ∀t0 ∈
Γ, t ≥ t0
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ R(F (ρt0), t) + p(t),
where R(x, t) = xt−t0ρt0+q0
1−xt−t0
1−x , and p(t) is given
in Lemma 3.
2) The estimation error has a finite uniform upper bound,
i.e., ∀t0 ∈ Γ,
sup
t≥t0
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ ρt0 + sup
t≥t0
p(t).
3) The limit superior of the estimation error is upper
bounded, i.e.,
lim sup
t→∞
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ inf
t0∈Γ
ρt0 +
√
NβγL
1− ‖A‖ γL .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 1. On Theorem 1, we have two remarks:
• The condition (9) can be examined offline by a designer
with global system knowledge. The parameters β, L are
given in the implementation of Algorithm 1. Although η0
is a bound of the initial estimation error, we can adjust
it bigger to meet the requirement. The condition (9) is
satisfied if L is sufficiently large, and the bounds s, bw, bv
and ‖A‖ are small. Note that either reducing ‖A‖ and
the noise bounds bw, bv , or increasing the consensus step
L will lead to a smaller error bound.
• In Theorem 1, 1) provides an real-time upper bound of
the estimation error ei(t), which is useful in Section
4 for the design of an attack detector. Both 2) and 3)
study the uniform upper bounds of ei(t), which can be
numerically obtained offline by a designer with global
system knowledge.
Since the condition (9) is complex, its feasibility needs
to be testified, i.e., whether there exist positive parameters
L > ln‖A‖ln γ−1 , β, η0 such that (9) is satisfied. We note that if
‖A‖ < 1, it is trivial to design a filter such that the estimation
error is upper bounded without considering the estimation
precision. To show the effectiveness of Algorithm 1, in the
following theorem, we will show that it is feasible to design
the parameters L > ln‖A‖ln γ−1 , β, η0 such that the condition (9) is
satisfied under the case that ‖A‖ ≥ 1. This indicates that the
estimation error of Algorithm 1 is upper bounded for a class
of unstable systems.
Theorem 2. (Feasibility) It is feasible to find positive param-
eters β, η0 and L >
ln‖A‖
ln γ−1 , and a scalar  > 0 such that the
condition (9) holds for ‖A‖ ∈ [1, 1 + ), if and only if
λ0 > s, (10)
where λ0 and s are given in (6) and (2), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In the following theorem, by adding another condition, we
show all the observations of attack-free sensors will eventually
not be saturated, which contributes to a tighter bound than that
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. (Bounds) Under the same conditions as in
Theorem 1, if there is a time t0 ∈ Γ (e.g., t0 = 1), such
that
ρt0 + sup
t≥t0
p(t) <
β − bw − bv
‖A‖ (11)
then the following results hold:
1) All the observations of attack-free sensors will eventually
not be saturated, i.e., ki(t) = 1, ∀i ∈ Ac(t), ∀t > t0;
2) Compared to 1) of Theorem 1, a tighter upper bound of
estimation error is ensured, i.e., ‖ei(t)‖ ≤ R($, t) +
p(t),∀t > t0;
3) Compared with 3) of Theorem 1, a tighter upper bound
of the limit superior of the estimation error is ensured,
i.e., lim sup
t→∞
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ q01−$ +
√
NβγL
1−‖A‖γL <∞,
where p(t), ρt, and R(·, t) are given in Lemma 3, (7), and 1)
of Theorem 1, respectively, and
$ = max
M⊂{1,2,...,N}:|M|=N−s
∥∥∥∥∥
(
In − 1
N
∑
i∈M
CTi Ci
)
A
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Proof. See Appendix D.
Design of β: As we discussed in Subsection 3-A that the
observation confidence parameter β in (4) reflects the usage
tradeoff between attack-free observations and compromised
observations. The main idea to design β is to minimize two
asymptotic upper bounds in Theorems 1 and 3 w.r.t. β under
the constraints in (9) and (11), respectively. Since in 3) of The-
orem 1, inft0∈Γ ρt0 is not analytical w.r.t. β, we may choose
an upper bound of inft0∈Γ ρt0 , e.g., limt→∞R(F (η0), t), as
the optimization objective function w.r.t. β. We note that the
7two optimization problems of the two cases in Theorems 1
and 3 are nonlinear and non-convex, for which some heuristic
optimization methods can be utilized [42].
Resilience of Algorithm 1: The resilience of an algorithm is
on the relationship between the number of the attacked sensors
and its estimation performance. Recall that s is the upper
bound of the attacked sensor number given in Assumption 3,
then we study the relationship between s and an upper bound
of the estimation error in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the same conditions as in Theorem 1,
lim sup
t→∞
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ f(s), (12)
where f(s) = q¯01−F (η0) +
√
NβγL
1−‖A‖γL is a monotonically non-
decreasing function w.r.t. s, in which q¯0 = bw + max{β, bw +
bv + ‖A‖ p0} if ‖A‖ < 1, otherwise q¯0 = q0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
C. Connection with 2s-sparse observability
It is well known that in complete graphs, there are no con-
sensus algorithms which can tolerate more than 1/3 Byzantine
sensors [23]. Since this paper considers milder attacks, i.e., the
case of observation attacks, the number of the attacked sensors
is restricted to be less than 1/2 sensors in the centralized
framework [12, 31]. The sparse observability in the follow-
ing is on the system observability under sensor observation
attacks.
Definition 1. (s-sparse observability [43]) The linear system
defined by (1) is said to be s-sparse observable if for every set
Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with |Γ| = s, the pair (A,CΓ¯) is observable,
where CΓ¯ is the remaining matrix by removing Cj , j ∈ Γ from
[CT1 , C
T
2 , . . . , C
T
N ]
T .
Definition 2. (One-step s-sparse observability) The linear
system defined by (1) is said to be one-step s-sparse observable
if for every set Γ ⊆ {1, . . . , N} with |Γ| = s, the pair
CT
Γ¯
CΓ¯ =
∑N
i=1,i/∈Γ C
T
i Ci  0, where CΓ¯ is the remaining
matrix by removing Cj , j ∈ Γ from [CT1 , CT2 , . . . , CTN ]T .
Definition 1 corresponds to the n-step (collective) observ-
ability. In the centralized framework, if the observations of
s sensors are compromised, the system should be 2s-sparse
observable to guarantee the effective estimation of system state
[43]. The direct relationship between (10) and the one-step s-
sparse observability is given in the following.
Proposition 3. A necessary condition to guarantee λ0 > s
is that the system (1) is one-step 2s-sparse observable. If the
observation vectors are orthogonal, then one-step 2s-sparse
observability is also a sufficient condition to guarantee λ0 > s.
Proof. The proof can refer to [28].
If the observations of any s sensors are under attacks, based
on the results of Theorems 1, 2 and Proposition 3, Algorithm 1
is able to to achieve effective estimation for unstable dynamics
if system (1) is one-step 2s-sparse observable. For a scalar
system with Ci = 1, i ∈ V , (10) holds if the number of
attacked sensors is no larger than s = dN/2e − 1.
4. SECURED DISTRIBUTED FILTER WITH ATTACK
DETECTION
The observations of an attacked sensor will inevitably
cause the filter performance degradation. Thus, in this section,
we aim to design an online detector for each sensor to
detect/identify whether this sensor is under attack or not.
Moreover, once an attacked sensor is detected, then the filter
and the detector will adaptively adjust. In the sequel, we need
the following assumption, which is common in the literature
[12, 13, 15–22].
Assumption 4. The attacked sensor set is fixed over time,
i.e., A(t) = A, such that |A| ≤ s, where s and the global
knowledge of system matrices, noise bounds, can be offline
stored at each sensor.
Under Assumption 4, we denote Ac the complement of A
in the sensor set V , i.e., Ac⋃A = V .
A. Attack detectors
In the following, we define the detectable set and unde-
tectable (or stealthy) set of attack signals {ai(t)}.
Definition 3. The set Ai(t) = {ai(t) ∈ R||ξi(t) + ai(t)| >
φi(t)} and the set Aci (t) = {ai(t) ∈ R||ξi(t)+ai(t)| ≤ φi(t)}
are called the detectable attacking set (DAS) and unde-
tectable (or stealthy) attacking set (UAS) of sensor i at time
t, respectively, where ξi(t) is the attack-free observation inno-
vation, i.e., ξi(t) = CiA(x(t−1)− xˆ(t−1))+v(t)+w(t−1)
and φi(t) is a known upper bound of |ξi(t)|.
To quantify the DAS of any sensor at each time, in the
following, we investigate the design of φi(t).
Lemma 2. Under the same conditions as in Theorem 1 and
Assumption 4, for Algorithm 1, the observation innovation of
of each attack-free sensor is upper bounded, i.e., for any t0 ∈
Γ,
|yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)| ≤ ϕ(t), i ∈ Ac, t > t0, (13)
where
ϕ(t) = ‖A‖ [R(F (ρt0), t) + p(t)] + bw + bv, (14)
and R(·, ·) and Γ are given in Theorem 1, F (ρt) and p(t) in
(8) and Lemma 3, respectively.
Proof. The conclusion holds by employing (28) and 1) of
Theorem 1.
It is explicitly shown in (13) that the innovation yi(t) −
CiAxˆi(t − 1) for any attack-free sensors lies in the interval
[−ϕ(t), ϕ(t)]. Then we propose a sensor attack detector in the
following.
Attack Detector 1: Sensor i is believed to be under attack
if the following inequality holds
|yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)| > ϕ(t), i ∈ V, (15)
where ϕ(t) is given in (14).
The attack detector in (15), together with Algorithm 1, is
to detect whether the observation yi(t) is compromised. By
8Definition 3, if there is a time t such that ai(t) ∈ Ai(t),
where Ai(t) = {ai(t)||ξi(t) + ai(t)| > ϕ(t)}, then the attack
detector 1 in (15) will find out that this sensor has been
attacked. For the attack signals ai(t) such that the innovation
falls within the interval [−ϕ(t), ϕ(t)], e.g., ai(t) = −ξi(t),
which are undetectable for all the time interval of interest (i.e.,
(15) is violated all the time), we can not use (15) to make
sure whether these sensors are under attack or not. However,
the influence of these undetectable/stealthy signals ai(t) (e.g.,
ai(t) = −ξi(t)) to the estimation performance is quantized by
the feasible upper bound ϕ(t). It will be shown in the sequel
that a modified attack detector can deal with these undetected
signals better. We note that once a sensor is detected to be
attacked by (15), then this sensor is under attack for sure due
to Lemma 2.
Denote Ii(t) the detected attacked sensor set known to
sensor i at time t, which is updated for each sensor through
neighboring communication. Moreover, we let di(t) = |Ii(t)|,
which differs at sensors due to network delay. To improve the
estimation performance, under Assumption 4, it is necessary
to discard all the subsequent observations of the successfully
detected sensors. Thus, we propose the following operation to
isolate the observations of these detected sensors.
Isolation of detected sensor observations: If a sensor i,
i ∈ V , is detected to be under attack at a time T ∗, i.e., i ∈
Ii(T ∗), then the sensor will no longer use its observations for
t ≥ T ∗.
To obtain a smaller upper bound of the innovation of all the
attack-free sensors, we define the following sequence {ρ¯t,i ∈
R}. For each i ∈ V , t = 0, 1, . . . , define
ρ¯t+1,i = F¯ (ρ¯t,i, t)ρ¯t,i + q¯i(t), ρ¯0,i = η0 (16)
where
F¯ (ρ¯t,i, t) = ‖A‖
(
1− k
∗(ρ¯t,i, t)
N
λ0
)
,
k∗(ρ¯t,i, t) = min
{
1,
β
‖A‖ (p(t) + ρ¯t,i) + bw + bv
}
,
q¯i(t) = q0 − di(t)β
N
,
and q0 is given in (8).
Then we propose Detector 2 in the following.
Attack Detector 2: Sensor i is believed to be under attack
if the following inequality holds
|yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)| > ϕ¯i(t), i ∈ V, (17)
where ϕ¯i(t) = ‖A‖ [ρ¯t,i + p(t)] + bw + bv , and ρ¯t,i is given
in (16).
We propose a secured distributed filter with detection in Al-
gorithm 2, which is modified from Algorithm 1 by employing
the attack detector in (17) and the defined observation isolation
operation.
Proposition 4. Under the same conditions as in Theorem 1
and Assumption 4, for Algorithm 2:
1) The observation innovation of each attack-free sensor is
upper bounded, i.e.,
|yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)| ≤ ϕ¯i(t), i ∈ Ac; (18)
Algorithm 2 Secured Distributed Filter with Detection:
1: Initial setting: (xˆi(0), Ii(0), s, β, L, α)
2: Update with detection: let Ii(t) = Ii(t− 1)
if i ∈ Ii(t), then
x˜i(t) = Axˆi(t− 1)
elseif |Ii(t)| =: di(t) = s
x˜i(t) = Axˆi(t− 1) + CTi (yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1))
elseif |yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t−1)| > ϕ¯i(t), were ϕ¯i(t) is in (17)
x˜i(t) = Axˆi(t− 1), let Ii(t) = Ii(t) ∪ {i}
else
ki(t) = min
{
1, β|yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t−1)|
}
x˜i(t) = Axˆi(t− 1) +ki(t)CTi (yi(t)−CiAxˆi(t− 1))
end
3: Consensus for L steps: xˆi,0(t) = x˜i(t), Ii,0(t) = Ii(t)
For lth consensus, l = 1, . . . , L:
For sensor i, i = 1, . . . , N :
Sensor i receives xˆj,l−1(t) and Ij,l−1(t) from neigh-
bor sensor j,
xˆi,l(t) = xˆi,l−1(t)− α
∑
j∈Ni(xˆi,l−1(t)− xˆj,l−1(t))
Ii,l(t) =
⋃
j∈Ni Ij,l−1(t)
⋃ Ii,l−1(t)
end
4: Output step: xˆi(t) = xˆi,L(t), Ii(t) = Ii,L(t).
2) Given any t0 ∈ Γ, for t > t0, (18) provides a smaller
bound of the innovation than that in (13), i.e., ϕ¯i(t) ≤
ϕ(t), where ϕ(t) is given in (14) and Γ is given in
Theorem 1;
3) For each sensor i, i ∈ V , ϕ¯i(t) is monotonically de-
creasing w.r.t. the number of the detected sensors, i.e.,
di(t).
Proof. Due to page limitation, we provide the proof idea. To
prove (18), we just need to show ρ¯t,i ≥ ‖e˜(t)‖, where e˜(t) =
‖ 1N
∑N
i=1 xˆi(t) − x(t)‖. This is done by referring to (25)–
(29), and by noting that the number of attacked but undetected
sensors is upper bounded by s − di(t). 2) is obtained, due
to p(t) ≤ p0 and q¯i(t) ≤ q0. 3) holds, since ρ¯t,i in (16) is
monotonically decreasing w.r.t. di(t).
B. Error bounds and convergence
In this subsection, we will study the boundedness of the
estimation error and the convergence of the estimates for
Algorithm 2.
Denote by d(t) the maximal number of detected sensors at
time t, i.e., d(t) = maxi∈V{di(t)}. We assume d(0) = 0.
Given any T ≥ 0, for ∀t ≥ T , we construct the following
sequence {ρ¯t ∈ R|ρ¯t, t ≥ T}
ρ¯t+1 = F (ρ¯t)ρ¯t + q¯0, ρ¯T = ρT , (19)
where q¯0 = q0− d(T )βN , ρT and F (·) are given in (7) and (8),
respectively.
9Theorem 4. Consider system (1) satisfying the same condi-
tions as in Theorem 1 and Assumption 4. For Algorithm 2,
lim sup
t→∞
‖ei(t)‖ ≤W (T ),∀T ≥ 0.
where
W (T ) = inf
t0∈Γ
ρt0 +
√
NβγL
1− ‖A‖ γL −
d(T )β
N(1− F∗) ,
and F∗ = inf
t0∈Γ¯
F (ρ¯t0) ∈ [0, 1), Γ¯ = {t ≥ T |ρ¯t ≤ ρ¯t−1}.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The upper bound in Theorem 4 is related with the detected
sensor number at time T (i.e., d(T )). It means that one is able
to evaluate the asymptotic estimation performance at time T ,
based on the knowledge of the system and the accumulated
detected sensor number until time T . We see that with the
increasing of d(T ), the bound is decreasing.
In the following theorem, we provide the conditions such
that the state estimate of Algorithm 2 converges to the system
state asymptotically. Before that, we denote
K¯Ac = diag{k1(t)I1∈Ac , . . . , kN (t)IN∈Ac} ∈ RN×N .
Theorem 5. (Convergence) Consider system (1) satisfying
the same conditions as in Theorem 1, Assumption 4, and the
following conditions
1) the system is noise-free
2) there is a finite time tˆ0 such that di(tˆ0) = s
3) the matrix G is Schur stable,
then the estimate of each sensor by Algorithm 2 will asymp-
totically converge to the state, i.e.,
lim
t→∞ ‖xˆi(t)− x(t)‖ = 0, i ∈ V,
where
G =
(
2 ‖A‖ γL ‖A‖ γL√N − s
‖m˜‖
∥∥∥M˜∥∥∥
)
,
M˜ =
(
In − 1
N
∑
i∈Ac
CTi Ci
)
A,
m˜ =
1
N
(1TN ⊗ In)C¯T K¯AcC¯(IN ⊗A).
(20)
Proof. See Appendix G.
Remark 2. If an attack signal, whose absolute value is
larger than ϕ¯i(t), is inserted into the observation, Algorithm
2 is able to identify that sensor i is under attack. Thus, the
knowledge of the attacker on the designed detector especially
on the threshold ϕ¯i(t) will largely influence the detected
sensor number. Since this paper considers the bounded noise
processes, a single large attack signal (larger than ϕ¯i(t))
will expose the attacked sensor for sure, which differs from
the methods based on constructing statistical variables (e.g.,
[44]).
Remark 3. For the noise-free case, if there is one attacked
sensor which is undetected all the time, then the convergence
of the estimation error can not be ensured. Because the
communication between the sensors will be corrupted by the
compromised observations of the undetected attacked sensor.
Thus, 2) is necessary to guarantee the convergence of the
system dynamics. The condition 3) can be fulfilled if the
consensus number L is relatively large, the number of the
attack-free sensors (i.e., |Ac|) is relatively large, or the norm
of the transition matrix (i.e., ‖A‖) is small.
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we carry out some numerical simulations to
show the effectiveness of the proposed Algorithms 1 and 2.
Assume a scalar system with A = 1.02 and Ci = 1,
i = 1, . . . , 30. Both the process noise w(t) and observation
noise vi(t), i = 1, . . . , 30, follow the uniform distribution
between [−0.01, 0.01]. The bounds in Assumption 1 are
assumed to be bv = 0.01, bw = 0.01, η0 = 50. The initial
state is x(0) = η0/2, whose estimate xˆ(0) follows the
uniform distribution between [−η0/2, η0/2]. We suppose the
time interval t = [0, 200] with sampling step 1. Suppose that
the attacker will insert the signal ai(t) = 2(Cix(t) + vi(t)) if
sensor i is under attack. We conduct a Monto Carlo experiment
with 100 runs. For i = 1, . . . , 30, define
ηi(t) =
1
100
100∑
j=1
∥∥∥eji (t)∥∥∥ , η(t) = 1100
100∑
j=1
max
i∈{1,...,30}
∥∥∥eji (t)∥∥∥ ,
where eji (t) is the state estimation error by sensor i at time t
in the jth run.
A. Secured distributed estimation
In this subsection, we will verify the performance of Algo-
rithm 1 by considering the case that the attacked sensor set
is time-varying. Assume that the distributed sensor networks
under sensor attacks follow the switching way in Fig. 3 at
each run, where a node in red means the node is under attack.
By selecting β = 3 and L = 1 for Algorithm 1, the
estimation error ηi(t), i = 3, 5, 10, 26 is provided in (a) of Fig.
4. From this figure, we see that there are three time instants,
i.e., t = 51, 101, 151, at which the error dynamics of the
plotted sensors fluctuate. The reason why the error dynamics
of one sensor increase lies in two aspects. First, after a certain
time instant, this sensor is under attack. If so, its observations
would be compromised and the estimation performance of this
sensor would be degraded. For example, in (a) of Fig. 4, the
errors of sensor 5 after time t = 151, sensor 10 after time
t = 51, and sensor 26 after time t = 101 all increase for this
reason. The second aspect is that after a certain time instant,
the neighbor of one senor is under attack. For this sensor,
its error would also increase due to the consensus influence.
For example, in (a) of Fig. 4, the error of sensor 3 increases
after time t = 51, since a neighbor of sensor 3, i.e., sensor
10, would be under attack after time t = 51. The relationship
between the estimation error η(t) and the consensus parameter
L is studied in (b) of Fig. 4. The result shows that with the
increase of consensus step, the estimation error η(t) decreases.
This conforms to the analysis in Theorems 1, 3 and 4, where
a larger consensus step contributes to a small estimation error
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by compressing its upper bound. The connection between the
estimation error η(t) and the parameter β is studied in (c) of
Fig. 4 under L = 4. The figure shows that the estimation error
with β = 5 is the smallest within the errors by respectively
setting β = 0.1, 5, 2000. The result conforms to the discussion
on the design of β which can not be too small or too large in
the algorithm setting.
To show the resilience of Algorithm 1, for the case that
the attacked sensor set is time-invariant, under L = 4 and
β = 5, we study the relationship between |A| and η(t) in Fig.
6 by randomly choosing a subset of the whole sensors (i.e.,
A). The result of this figure shows that with the increase of
|A|, the estimation error η(t) will become larger. Also, when
the number |A| is equal to or larger than half sensors, the
estimation error will be unstable.
B. Secured distributed estimation under detection
In this subsection, we consider the introduction case in
Fig. 1 where the attacked sensor set is time-invariant, with
A(t) = A = {3, 12, 13, 15, 23, 28}, under which the estima-
tion performance of Algorithms 1 and 2 will be studied.
By selecting β = 3 and L = 1 for Algorithm 1, the
estimation error ηi(t), i = 3, 5, 10, 26 is provided in (a) of Fig.
5. Compared with the result in (a) of Fig. 4, the estimation
errors of these sensors in (a) of Fig. 5 do no fluctuate. Because
the attacked sensor set is time-invariant, which can lead to
the steady estimation errors. The relationships between the
parameters L, β and the estimation error η(t) are shown in
(b) and (c) of Fig. 5. We note that in (b) of Fig. 5, when
L = 0, the estimation error η(t) is divergent, since for the
attacked sensors, the local observability is violated. Fig. 5 (b)
also shows that with the increase of the consensus step L, the
estimation error of Algorithm 1 is decreasing. In (c) of Fig.
5, the parameter β = 5 can lead to the stable estimation error,
while in (c) of Fig. 4, the estimation error for the parameter
β = 5 fluctuates due to the switching of the attacked sensor
set.
To compare with existing algorithms, for the situation in
Fig. 1, we further assume that Ci = 0, i ∈ {1, 25} ⊂ V ,
and Ci = 1, otherwise. In other words, sensor i, i ∈ {1, 25},
has no observations by itself. Also, we define the estimation
errors for the attacked sensor set and attack-free sensor set,
respectively,
ηA(t) =
1
100
100∑
j=1
max
i∈A
∥∥∥eji (t)∥∥∥ , ηAc(t) = 1100
100∑
j=1
max
i∈Ac
∥∥∥eji (t)∥∥∥ .
In Fig. 7, the estimation performance of Algorithms 1 and
2 with L = 5, the local-filtering based resilient estimation
(LFRE) [20] and the scalar-gain consensus filter2 (SGCF)
is compared. The figure shows that Algorithms 1 and 2
can provide estimates with stable estimation errors for both
attacked sensors and attack-free sensors, but the estimation
errors of LFRE and SGCF are divergent. Since sensors 1 and
25 have no observations and have two neighbors at most, the
2The filter has the same form as Algorithm 1 but the gain ki(t) = 1 for
t ≥ 1. This filter is with the same idea as in [45], which did not consider the
attack scenario.
estimation performance for the two sensors would be degraded
by employing LFRE which removes the maximal and minimal
estimates received from neighbors [20]. Compared with Algo-
rithm 1, Algorithm 2 can provide a smaller estimation error
by successfully detecting all the attacked sensors. This shows
the resilience of Algorithm 2.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the secured distributed filtering problem
for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noises under
attacked sensor observations, where a malicious attacker can
compromise a time-varying and unknown subset of sensors
and manipulate the observations arbitrarily. First, we proposed
a consensus-based distributed filter. Then, we provided a suffi-
cient condition to guarantee the boundedness of the estimation
error. The feasibility condition for a class of unstable dynamics
was analyzed through an equivalent statement, which connects
to 2s-sparse observability in the centralized framework in
certain scenarios. By confining the attacked sensor set to be
time-invariant, we then proposed a secured filter with an online
local attack detector. The resilience of the secured filter with
detection was verified by an explicit relationship between the
upper bound of the estimation error and the number of detected
attacked sensors. Moreover, for the noise-free case, we proved
that the state estimate of each sensor asymptotically converges
to the system state.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
First, we prove 2). We consider the time t = t0 + 1,
xt0+1 = F (xt0)xt0 + q0 ≤ xt0 . (21)
For t = t0 + 2, by (21) and the condition that F (·) ∈ [0, 1]
is a monotonically non-decreasing function, we have xt0+2 =
F (xt0+1)xt0+1 + q0 ≤ F (xt0+1)xt0 + q0 ≤ F (xt0)xt0 + q0 ≤
xt0 . By recursively applying the above procedure, we have
supt≥t0 xt ≤ xt0 .
Next, we prove 1), which trivially holds for t = t0.
We consider the case of t > t0 in the following. By 2)
and the condition that F (·) ∈ [0, 1] is a monotonically
non-decreasing function, we have F (xt−1) ≤ F (xt0). Then
xt ≤ F (xt0)xt−1 + q0. If q0 6= 0, then F (xt0) ∈ [0, 1). Thus,
1) is satisfied by recursively applying the inequality for t− t0
times.
Finally, we prove 3). By 1) and the definition of lim sup,
we have lim sup
t→∞
xt = inf
t∈Z+
sup
m≥t
xm ≤ inf
t∈Γ
sup
m≥t
xm ≤ inf
t∈Γ
xt.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Let ei(t) be the estimation error of sensor i by Algorithm 1,
i.e., ei(t) = xˆi(t)− x(t). Then we have ei(t) = e˜(t) + e¯i(t),
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Fig. 3. The distributed sensor networks with attacked sensors at different times.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
sensor 3
sensor 5
sensor 10
sensor 26
0 5
0
5
10
15
(a) The estimation errors of some sensors.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 100 200
0
2000
4000 L=0
L=1
L=2
L=4
(b) The relationship between L and η(t).
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
=0.1
=5
=2000
0 100 200
0
500
1000
(c) The relationship between β and η(t).
Fig. 4. Estimation performance of Algorithm 1 for the sensor networks in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 5. Estimation performance of Algorithm 1 for the sensor network in Fig. 1.
where e¯i(t) := xˆi(t) − xˆavg , and e˜(t) = xˆavg − x(t), and
xˆavg(t) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 xˆi(t). Besides, we denote
X(t) = 1N ⊗ x(t) ∈ RNn,
E¯(t) =
[
e¯T1 (t), . . . , e¯
T
N (t)
]T
,
Y (t) =
[
yT1 (t), . . . , y
T
N (t)
]T ∈ RN ,
V (t) =
[
vT1 (t), . . . , v
T
N (t)
]T ∈ RN ,
Xˆ(t) =
[
xˆT1 (t), . . . , xˆ
T
N (t)
]T ∈ RNn, (22)
C¯ = diag{C1, . . . , CN} ∈ RN×Nn,
K¯(t) = diag{k1(t), . . . , kN (t)} ∈ RN×N ,
PNn =
1
N
(1N ⊗ In)(1N ⊗ In)T ∈ RNn×Nn,
K¯A(t) = diag{k1(t)I1∈A(t), . . . , kN (t)IN∈A(t)} ∈ RN×N ,
K¯Ac(t) = diag{k1(t)I1∈Ac(t), . . . , kN (t)IN∈Ac(t)} ∈ RN×N .
The idea for the proof is that we first show ‖e¯i(t)‖ is upper
bounded by p(t), and then we prove ‖e˜(t)‖ is upper bounded
by the quantities in 1)–3) of the theorem. The following
lemma, whose proof is omitted due to page limitation, shows
‖e¯i(t)‖ ≤ p(t). We refer the reader to [37], where a similar
proof of the following lemma is given.
Lemma 3. Consider Algorithm 1, and let Assumptions 1 - 2
hold. If α = 2λ2(L)+λmax(L) , and L >
ln‖A‖
ln γ−1 , then for t ≥ 0,∥∥E¯(t)∥∥ ≤ p(t), (23)
where E¯(t) and p(t) are given in (22) and (24), respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1: By Algorithm 1 and the notations
in (22), we have the dynamics of xˆavg(t) in (24). Due to
(1TN⊗In)PNn = (1TN⊗In) (INn − α(L ⊗ In))L = (1TN⊗In),
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we have
e˜(t) =Mte˜(t− 1)− m¯t + m˜t, (25)
where Mt, m˜t, and m¯t are given in (24). Note that m˜t can
be rewritten in the following
m˜t =
∑
i∈A(t)
CTi ki(t)(|yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)|).
Then by (4) and Assumption 3, we have
‖m˜t‖ ≤ s
N
β. (26)
For m¯t, by Assumption 3 and ki(t) ≤ 1, we have
‖m¯t‖ ≤ ‖w(t− 1)‖+ |A
c(t)|
N
(‖A‖ ∥∥E¯(t− 1)∥∥
+ ‖w(t− 1)‖+ bv)
≤ N − s
N
(bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0) + bw, (27)
where the second inequality is obtained by Lemma 3 and
supt≥1 p(t) ≤ p0, in which p0 is defined in (8). Based on (25)–
(27), we construct the sequence {ρt} in (7). In the following,
we prove that ‖e˜(t)‖ ≤ ρt.
At the initial time, i.e., t = 0, by Assumption 1, we have
‖e˜(0)‖ = ‖xˆavg(0)− x(0)‖ ≤ 1N
∑N
i=1 ‖xˆi(0)− x(0)‖ ≤ η0.
Due to ρ0 = η0, ‖e˜(t)‖ ≤ ρt for t = 0. Suppose at time t−1,
‖e˜(t− 1)‖ ≤ ρt−1. At time t, for i ∈ Ac(t), we consider
|yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)|
≤ ‖A‖ ‖ei(t− 1)‖+ bw + bv
≤‖A‖ (‖e¯i(t− 1)‖+ ‖e˜(t− 1)‖) + bw + bv
≤‖A‖ (p0 + ρt−1) + bw + bv, (28)
where the last inequality of (28) is obtained by noting that
supt≥0 ‖e¯i(t)‖ ≤ supt≥0 p(t) ≤ p0 and p0 is defined in (8).
Recall the form of ki(t), by (28), for i ∈ Ac(t), we have
ki(t) ≥ k∗(ρt−1) := min
{
1, β‖A‖(p0+ρt−1)+bw+bv
}
> 0.
Then
‖Mt‖ ≤‖A‖
∥∥∥∥∥∥
In − k∗(ρt−1)
N
∑
i∈Ac(t)
CTi Ci
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤‖A‖
(
1− k
∗(ρt−1)
N
λ0
)
. (29)
Taking norm operator on both sides of (25) and noting (26),
(27), (29) and (7), we have ‖e˜(t)‖ ≤ ρt.
If (9) holds, we have ρ1 ≤ ρ0 = η0, which means that the
defined set Γ = {t ≥ 1|ρt ≤ ρt−1} is non-empty. Since the
defined F (ρt) in (8) is monotonically non-decreasing function,
the conclusions of this theorem are obtained by applying the
results in Lemma 1, ‖ei(t)‖ ≤ ‖e˜(t)‖+ ‖e¯i(t)‖ and (23).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
1) Sufficiency:
Case 1: First, we consider the case s > 0. We aim to prove
that for ‖A‖ ∈ [1, 1 + ), where  = λ0−s4(N−λ0) > 0, we can
find positive parameters β, η0 and L >
ln‖A‖
ln γ−1 , such that the
equation (9) holds. Note that if sβNη0 6= 1, the equation (9) is
equivalent to
ϑ0m0 ≥ ‖A‖ , (30)
where
ϑ0 = 1− Q0
η0
(
1− sβ
Nη0
)−1
,
m0 =
(
1− sβ
Nη0
)(
1− k
∗
0λ0
N
)−1
,
k∗0 = k
∗(η0),
Q0 =
N − s
N
(bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0) + bw.
(31)
Thus, instead of proving the equation (9) directly, we aim to
prove ϑ0m0 ≥ ‖A‖ ,∀ ‖A‖ ∈ [1, 1 + ), sβNη0 6= 1.
There is a scalar η0,1 > 0, such that for any η0 ≥ η0,1, we
are able to find L > ln‖A‖ln γ−1 and β satisfying
β ≥ (1 + )(p0 + η0) + bw + bv,
β ≤ (1 + + λ0 − s
4s
)η0.
(32)
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xˆavg(t) = Axˆavg(t− 1) + 1
N
(1TN ⊗ In)PNn (INn − α(L ⊗ In))L C¯T K¯(t)h(t),
h(t) = Y (t)− C¯(IN ⊗A)Xˆ(t− 1), p(t) =
√
NβγL
1− (‖A‖ γL)t
1− ‖A‖ γL ,
Mt =
In − 1
N
∑
i∈Ac(t)
ki(t)C
T
i Ci
A, m˜t = 1
N
(1TN ⊗ In)C¯T K¯A(t)(t)h(t),
m¯t = w(t− 1) + 1
N
(1TN ⊗ In)C¯T K¯Ac(t)(t)
(
C¯((IN ⊗A)E¯(t− 1)− IN ⊗ w(t− 1))− V (t)
)
.
(24)
where p0 is defined in (8). By (32), we have k∗0 = 1 and
sβ
Nη0
< 1. Then
m0 =
(
1− sβ
Nη0
)(
1− λ0
N
)−1
=
(
N
s
− β
η0
)(
N − λ0
s
)−1
= 1 +
(
λ0
s
− β
η0
)(
s
N − λ0
)
(a)
≥ 1 +
(
λ0
s
− 1− − λ0 − s
4s
)(
s
N − λ0
)
(b)
≥ 1 + 2 (33)
where (a) and (b) are obtained by applying (32) and s ≤
N − λ0, respectively. Given 1 = 1+2 , there is a scalar η0,2
larger than η0,1, such that ∀η0 ≥ η0,2, ϑ0 ≥ 1 − 1 = 1+1+2 .
By (30) and (33), we have ϑ0m0 ≥ 1 +  ≥ ‖A‖ .
Case 2: For the attack-free case, i.e., s = 0, similar to case
1, we aim to prove ϑ0m0 ≥ ‖A‖ , where ϑ0 = 1− Q0η0 ,m0 =(
1− k∗0λ0N
)−1
. In this case, we choose ‖A‖ ∈ [1, ), where
 = λ02(2N−λ0) . There is a scalar η0,3 > 0, such that for any
η0 ≥ η0,3, we are able to find L > ln‖A‖ln γ−1 and β satisfying
2β ≥ (1 + )(p0 + η0) + bw + bv, (34)
which ensures that k∗0 ≥ 12 . Thus, m0 ≥ 2N2N−λ0 = 1 + 2,
where 2 = λ02N−λ0 . There is a scalar η0,4 ≥ η0,3, such that
ϑ0 ≥ 1− 22(1+2) . Then ϑ0m0 ≥ 1 + λ02(2N−λ0) ≥ ‖A‖ .
Note that for η0 in the two cases above, we are able to make
it bigger such that the initial error condition in Assumption 1
holds.
2) Necessity:
We use the contradiction method. If λ0 > s does not hold,
i.e., λ0 ≤ s. Suppose the equation (9) holds, i.e.,
η0 − q0
η0
(
1− k
∗
0λ0
N
)−1
≥ ‖A‖ ≥ 1. (35)
If sβNη0 ≤ 1, the left-hand side of (35) is no larger than zero,
which contracts with the right-hand side of (35). Thus, sβNη0 >
1. Employing the same notations as case 1 of the sufficiency
proof, (35) is equivalent to ϑ0m0 ≥ ‖A‖ ≥ 1. Due to sβNη0 ≤
1, we have ϑ0 < 1. Then m0 has to be larger than 1, which
leads to sβNη0 <
k∗0λ0
N . It is equivalent to
s
λ0
<
k∗0η0
β . Due to
s
λ0
≥ 1, we have k∗0η0β > 1, which however is satisfied whether
k∗0 = 1 or k
∗
0 =
β
‖A‖(p0+η0)+bw+bv . Thus, the initial statement
is not right, which means λ0 > s.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
First, we prove 1). For i ∈ Ac(t), by 2) of Theorem 1, we
have sup
t≥t0
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ ρt0 + supt≥t0 p(t), thus,
sup
t≥t0+1
|yi(t)− CiAxˆi(t− 1)|
≤ ‖A‖ sup
t≥t0+1
‖ei(t− 1)‖+ bw + bv
≤‖A‖ (ρt0 + sup
t≥t0
p(t)) + bw + bv.
If (11) holds, by Algorithm 1, all the observations of the
attack-free sensors will eventually not be saturated, i.e.,
ki(t) = 1,∀i ∈ Ac(t), t ≥ t0 + 1.
Next, we prove 2). Following the proof of Theorem 1, by
(25) and (31), we have
e˜(t) = Mte˜(t− 1)− m¯t + m˜t,∀t ≥ t0 + 1, (36)
where ‖m˜t‖ ≤ sN β, ‖m¯t‖ ≤ Q0 and Mt =(
In − 1N
∑
i∈Ac(t) ki(t)C
T
i Ci
)
A. By 1) of this theorem, for
i ∈ Ac(t), ki(t) = 1, ∀t ≥ t∗, then ‖Mt‖ ≤ $. From
Theorem 1 and (6), we have 0 ≤ $ ≤ F (ρt0) < 1. The upper
bound of ei(t) is obtained by taking norm of both sides of
(36) and employing the previously mentioned upper bounds.
Finally, we prove 3). By the real-time upper bound of the
estimation error, it is straightforward to have its limit superior.
Next, we prove the limit superior bound is no larger than the
one in 3) of Theorem 1, i.e., q01−$ ≤ inft0∈Γ ρt0 . Employing the
property inf x+ y ≥ inf x+ inf y on ρt0+1 = F (ρt0)ρt0 + q0,
yields
inf
t0∈Γ
ρt0 ≥
q0
1− inf
t0∈Γ
F (ρt0)
(a)
≥ q0
1− ‖A‖ (1− 1N λ0)
≥ q0
1−$,
where (a) holds by considering the expression of F (·) in (8).
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E. Proof of Proposition 2
First, we consider the case that ‖A‖ < 1. In the case, we
have (12), by applying 1) of Theorem 1, and by choosing
t0 = 1 and q¯0 = bw + max{β, bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0}. From (6)
and (8), we see that F (η0) is a monotonically non-decreasing
function w.r.t. s. Thus f(s) is a monotonically non-decreasing
function w.r.t. s.
Second, we consider the case that ‖A‖ ≥ 1. In the case, we
have (12), by applying 1) of Theorem 1, and by choosing t0 =
1 and q¯0 = q0. Next, we show the f(s) is a monotonically non-
decreasing function w.r.t. s. As discussed above that F (η0) is a
monotonically non-decreasing function w.r.t. s, we just show
that q0 is a monotonically non-decreasing function w.r.t. s.
This is obviously ensured if β > bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0. Next, we
prove this point by contradiction. In other words, we assume
β ≤ bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0. By (9), it holds that
1− k∗(η0)λ0
N
≤ 1‖A‖
(
1− q0
η0
)
. (37)
Due to β ≤ bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0, we have q0 ≥ β + bw. Then a
necessary to ensure (37) is
1− k∗(η0)λ0
N
≤ 1‖A‖
(
1− β + bw
η0
)
. (38)
Under this assumption, by (8), we have k∗(η0) =
β
‖A‖(p0+η0)+bw+bv . By substituting k
∗(η0) into (38), we obtain
β
‖A‖ (p0 + η0) + bw + bv
λ0
N
≥ β + bw + (‖A‖ − 1)η0‖A‖ η0 ,
which can not be satisfied due to λ0 ≤ N and 1 ≤ ‖A‖ .
Therefore, the assumption β ≤ bw + bv + ‖A‖ p0 does not
hold.
F. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof is similar to the proofs of Theorems 1–3. In the
following, we just show the main points of this proof.
Given a time T > 0 and the number of the detected sensors
at time t, i.e., d(T ), similar to the proof of Theorem 1, for
∀t ≥ T , we construct the following sequence {ρ¯t ∈ R|ρ¯t} in
(19). It is straightforward to prove that for ∀t ≥ T , ‖e˜(t)‖ ≤
ρ¯t., where e˜(t) = 1N
∑N
i=1 xˆi(t) − x(t). Next, we study the
relationship between ρ¯t in (19) and ρt in (7). Due to ρ¯T = ρT ,
we have ρ¯T+1 = ρT+1− d(T )βN . Then, for t = T +2, we have
ρ¯T+2 = F (ρ¯T+1)ρT+1 + q0 − (F (ρ¯T+1) + 1)d(T )β
N
≤ ρT+2 − (F∗ + 1)d(T )β
N
.
where F∗ = inf
t0∈Γ¯
F (ρ¯t0) ∈ [0, 1), and Γ¯ = {t ≥ T |ρ¯t ≤
ρ¯t−1}. By recursively applying the above operation, for t ≥ T ,
we obtain
ρ¯t ≤ ρt − d(T )β
N
(
1− F t−T∗
1− F∗
)
.
Then by Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we have lim sup
t→∞
‖e˜(t)‖ ≤
inf
t0∈Γ
ρt0 − d(T )βN(1−F∗) . Thus, the first conclusion holds by apply-
ing the results in Lemma 1, ‖ei(t)‖ ≤ ‖e˜(t)‖ + ‖e¯i(t)‖ and
(23).
G. Proof of Theorem 5
Under the condition 1), due to the connectivity of the
network, there is a common time t˜ ≥ tˆ0, such that dj(t˜) =
s,∀j ∈ V . For t ≥ t˜, all the observations of the attacked
sensors are discarded. Then we have the compact form of
recursive state estimates of Algorithm 2 in the following
Xˆ(t) = (INn − α(L ⊗ In))L
[
(IN ⊗A)Xˆ(t− 1)
+ C¯T K¯Ac(Y (t)− C¯(IN ⊗A)Xˆ(t− 1))
]
. (39)
Let E¯(t) = Xˆ(t) − 1N ⊗ xˆavg(t), i.e., E¯(t) =
[e¯T1 (t), . . . , e¯
T
N (t)]
T . By referring to [37], we have∥∥E¯(t+ 1)∥∥
≤‖(IN ⊗A)‖
∥∥∥(INn − α(L ⊗ In)− PNn)L E¯(t)∥∥∥
+
∥∥(INn − PNn) (INn − α(L ⊗ In))L
C¯T K¯Ac(Y (t)− C¯(IN ⊗A)Xˆ(t− 1))
∥∥
≤2 ‖A‖ γL ∥∥E¯(t)∥∥+ ‖A‖ γL√N − s ‖e˜(t)‖ . (40)
Similar to (25), for i ∈ Ac, t ≥ t˜, ki(t) = 1, we have e˜(t +
1) = M˜ e˜(t) − m˜E¯(t), where M˜ and m˜ are given in (20).
Then
‖e˜(t+ 1)‖ ≤ ‖m˜‖ ∥∥E¯(t)∥∥+ ∥∥∥M˜∥∥∥ ‖e˜(t)‖ . (41)
By (40) and (41), if the matrix
(
2‖A‖γL ‖A‖γL√N−s
‖m˜‖ ‖M˜‖
)
is Schur
stable, then ‖e˜(t)‖ and ∥∥E¯(t)∥∥ go to zero asymptotically.
Thus, ‖ei(t)‖ is convergent to zero as time goes to infinity.
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